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ABSTRACT
 
Integration of commodity markets in developing countries has received considerable 
attention because price integration is perceived to be central to the success of food and 
agricultural policies. Price integration tests are performed in retail markets in Kinshasa (Zaire), 
i.e. between commodities, among retail markets, and between the wholesale and retail market 
level. Price transmission is measured by incorporating the co-integration concept into the 
classical long-run and shon-run market integration test. It is shown that although wholesale 
prices are input prices for retailers, they lack shon-run integration with retail prices. 
Differences exist between retail markets which do not reflect services or transponation costs. It 
is hypothesized that this is due to the existence ofsignificant transactions costs and deficiencies 
in information transmission. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The study of price integration in developing countries has a long history (Lele, 1971; 
Jones, 1972; Harriss, 1979; Southworth et al., 1979; Heytens, 1986; Delgado, 1986; Ravallion, 
1986; Timmer, 1987). Market integration is important because it is central to the success of 
agricultural and food policies and to household food security through trade and storage 
policies. Implementation of these policies is easier when markets are integrated because 
integration reduces the management burden by allowing concentration on one commodity for 
stabilization policies. Integration implies that markets may be connected along some 
dimensions but not others. Geographical links may be stable at one point in time but break 
down in others and markets may react differently to variation in quality or variety. 
Historically, the concept implied by the word "integration" has often been confused 
with that of perfect and effective competition. However, integrated markets do not have to 
be competitive (Harriss, 1979; Petzel, Monke, 1980; Monke, Petzel, 1984). Monke and Petzel 
(1984) define integrated markets as those in which prices of differentiated products do not 
behave "independently". Alternative statements of integration are that there is efficient 
arbitrage or that the law of one price holds between two regions. The failure of two or more 
markets to "be integrated" may be explained by a lack of linkage (autarkic markets), imperfect 
competition and impediments to efficient arbitrage, such as trade barriers, imperfect 
information or risk aversion. 
In the early 1980s, structural adjustment programs were started in many countries in 
• 
Africa. With respect to retail marketing, this meant price liberalization and the abolition of 
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price and market controls. However, even with "right prices", agricultural retail markets can 
still suffer from deficiencies because of market failures and externalities. Given that the 
traditional food retailing sector involves an impressive number of individual transactions in 
product and information flows, questions about price efficiency and price integration arise. 
In general, studies on food retailing in developing countries, and more specifically in 
Africa, are rare1. However, retailing costs constitute a large part of the final food price paid 
by the urban consumer. In Kinshasa (Zaire), retailing costs for most products have shown a 
dramatic increase recently. Retail margins of cassava, the main staple, increased from 18 
percent of the consumer price for cassava from Bandundu and 12 percent for cassava from Bas-
Zaire in 1984 to 35 and 45 percent respectively in 1989. This is a worrisome development 
given the importance of food in the household budget of the average urban consumer and the 
existing mal- and undernutrition in Kinshasa. A better understanding of the functioning and 
the price integration in retail markets might allow us to better delineate the appropriate role 
of the government. 
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, it links the classical price integration 
methodology with the co-integration concept of time series analysis. Second, it applies this 
methodology in a spatial approach to retail food markets in the metropolitan area of Kinshasa. 
Third, it extends this analysis to study price transmission between different commodities and 
1 Some hypotheses are given for this (Meissner, 1989): many political leaders in 
developing countries refer to marketing as a wasteful, parasitic and socially irrelevant activity; 
the merchant class in many developing countries belongs to foreign minorities, which are 
accused of exploiting the indigenous populations; political leaders tend to assign marketing 
improvement activities a very low priority while actively putting up barriers to their effective 
performance; and hunger in the midst of plenty is primarily caused by inequitable income 
distribution, a matter outside the scope of marketing. 
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between different market levels. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes 
the retailing system and the main characteristics of the average retailer. In Section III, 
estimation procedures are developed. Sections IV and V present the empirical results and 
conclusions. 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE RETAILING SYSTEM 
Kinshasa is one of the biggest urban centers in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated 
population of close to four million people. Demographic pressure has created enormous 
problems for housing, public provisions, transport, and food supplies. In May 1989, Kinshasa 
had 115 food markets with 72,000 food retailers (i.e. almost three percent of the urban 
population). The biggest market was the Marche Central with more than 15,000 retailers. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the characteristics of the average retailer. Food retailing is 
extremely small scale and fragmented. Typically, a food retailer buys a few bags of food 
products from an itinerant trader or a semi-wholesaler and sells the products in small fractions 
to the customer. In general, little transformation of the product is required. The quantity 
bought at the wholesale level serves the retailer from 3 to 6 days on average. Hence, it would 
be expected that prices are transmitted relatively fast from wholesale to retail. 
Retailers operate on a cash-and-carry basis and have a relatively narrow line of goods. 
The traditional marketing structure involves massive numbers of individual transactions. In 
addition transaction costs are elevated by the need for personal inspection of predominantly 
• 
unpacked and ungraded goods. Most food retailing is done by women. Only the marketing 
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of palm oil and living animals is partly done by men. Three quarters of the retailers say they 
bargain about the price with the supplier while sixty percent bargain about the price with the 
consumer. The lack of standardized sale units is a major reason for this and cheating on 
weights, measures and quality happens regularly. Minten (1995) shows how endogenous 
institutions developed in retail markets in Kinshasa as a result of significant transaction costs 
and asymmetric information. 
..
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Table 1: Mean Values and Standard Deviation of the Main Variables with Respect to the 
Retailer in Kinshasa (October - November 1990) 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mana&erial capabilities 
37.2 
9.1 
2.9 
8.6 
7.2 
8.4 
Age (years) 
Experience in the job (years) 
Number of ba&s bou&ht at once 
Cassava 
Maize 2.7 4.4 
Rice 1.4 0.8 
Peanuts 2.6 6.1 
Bananas (racine) 8.5 9.6 
Palm oil (barrel) 3.7 8.7 
Vegetables 4.7 11.6 
Beans 11.0 25.2 
Number of days to sell product 
2.7 1.5Cassava 
Maize 3.3 2.5 
Rice 3.6 2.6 
Peanuts 3.2 2.2 
Bananas 4.3 4.0 
Palm oil 6.2 6.2 
Vegetables 2.1 2.8 
Beans 5.1 3.9 
Losses (in %) 
Cassava 3.5 9.4 
Maize 5.8 24.9 
Rice 2.3 6.3 
Peanuts 2.9 9.5 
Bananas 12.5 14.0 
Palm oil 2.7 7.7 
Vegetables 6.1 10.0 
Beans 1.4 1.8 
Total value merchandise (1000 Z) 94.8 387.6 
-
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Table 2: Characteristics of Retailers in Kinshasa Expressed as a Percentage of All 
Retailers (October - November 1990) 
% of retailers 
Managerial Capabilities 
Male 
Education: 
- Primary school 
- Secondary school unfinished 
- Diplome d'Etat 
- Professional school 
- University 
5 
48 
43 
2 
7 
0 
Transaction Costs 
Buy always or often with the same trader 
Always sell the same products 
Buy always at the same place 
Tribal links with trader 
Gets credit from the seller 
Member of a likelembe 
Member of a savings bank 
Member of "papa carte" 
Owner of the table 
26 
85 
27 
4 
22 
27 
.3 
7 
78 
Market Conditions 
Arrange price with other retailers 
Fixed producer price by government 
Know prices on other markets 
60 
28 
50 
Transport 
By pousse-pousse 
By bus 
By mini-bus 
By taxi 
By carrier 
Myself 
44 
19 
18 
3 
10 
7 
Product 
Bought from itinerant trader 
Bought from wholesaler 
Bought from semi-wholesaler 
Bought from retailer 
39 
27 
22 
12 
-
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III. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
A. Data 
Monthly food prices on nine retail markets and five wholesale markets in Kinshasa 
(Zaire) were gathered by the division of markets, prices and rural credit (DMPCC) and the 
project K.U.Leuven - A.G.C.D. in the ministry of agriculture during the period 1984 - 1989, 
i.e. immediately after the implementation of the structural adjustment program. Four of the 
surveyed markets have a wholesale and retail market. The integration hypotheses are tested 
on deflated monthly prices. 
B. A Review 
Static price correlation has been the most common measure of market integration in 
agriculture (Lele, 1971; Jones, 1972; Southworth et al., 1979) but problems with this statistical 
test, especially the susceptibility to common trends, have led researchers to advocate the use 
of other procedures. The static bivariate method has been extended into a dynamic model of 
spatial price differentials in the model proposed by Ravallion (1986), which tests for short­
versus long-run integration by correlating the price in one region with lagged own prices and 
contemporaneous and lagged prices in another market. This method has been applied widely 
to measure spatial integration (see Heytens, 1986; Timmer, 1987; Faminow, Benson, 1990). In 
• 
this model, the price series for each local market is permitted to have its own autoregressive 
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structure and a dynamic relationship with market prices in a trading region. The Ravallion 
model appears to be a significant improvement for testing the nature of market integration, 
but some obvious problems remain (Heytens, 1986): determining appropriate reference prices 
(when there is no central wholesale or retail market) and variable specifications will be a 
problem in situations where a broad understanding of the market is limited; simultaneous 
equations bias is always a possibility, necessitating instrumental variables or faith that the bias 
is not too large; the model's parameters are likely to be sensitive to the time length of the 
data; and a high standard error on the coefficient for wholesale price may be due to its high 
correlation with lagged retail prices rather than weak market integration. 
Delgado (1986) uses a variance components method to measure integration. It involves 
showing that after removing a common seasonal trend and seasonal mean prices for each 
market, interactions between the residual price terms across markets are independent. Sexton, 
Kling and Carman (1991) develop an alternative methodology based on three market states that 
exhaust the possible arbitrage conditions: shortage, glut, and efficient market integration. With 
this approach prices are not treated as predetermined variables in the regression modeF, 
interregional shipment costs are endogenous and estimated within the model3, and the 
probability that markets are integrated is allowed to vary continuously. Constant mean 
transactions costs over time represents a fairly strong assumption of these two models and 
2 The choice of a price as predetermined is an arbitrary one and has been criticized by 
Timmer (1974) and others. 
3 Data on transport and storage costs, their variation across location and time and 
.> > 
aggregate flows through the hierarchy of markets at any given time period are usually very 
difficult and expensive to obtain (Delgado, 1986) 
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implies that empirical applications of the model require relatively short time series and!or 
periods of relatively stable prices. 
Alderman (1993), Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993) and Alexander and Wyeth (1994) 
are the first to take into account the concept of co-integration for the measurement of price 
integration. Alderman (1993) has stationary price series (1(0)) in Ghana and hence, testing for 
co-integration becomes impossible. Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993) develop a sequence of 
three tests to assess "full market integration" in the markets of West Bengal. They also add an 
extended structural and institutional description of the marketing system to complement their 
quantitative analysis. Alexander and Wyeth (1994) link the concept of co-integration to market 
integration, exogeneity and directions of causality in Indonesia. 
In conclusion, researchers have tried to refine the static market integration measure in 
a spatial and temporal manner. In many cases more information than solely price data is 
needed. However, detailed structural market models are heavy in their demands on data, which 
often result in undesirable levels of aggregation and use of dubious proxies. It seems necessary 
that market integration evidence must be assessed on a case-by-case basis with additional 
information on market structure and production technology. It is also important to note that 
the existence of market integration does not imply pedect competition and no uniform, easy 
test is yet available to enable us to make this inference without knowing more about the 
market structure. 
• 
,.. 
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c. Estimation Procedures 
In the case of the retail price as dependent variable, the Ravallion procedure can be 
formulated as: 
m n 
R =~ {3 R .+~ 'V.W .+'rJX +E 
I	 L..J r'I-J L..J'I I-I" I I 
j=l ;=0 
where Wt and Rt are the contemporaneous prices in the wholesale and retail market, m and 
n are the number of lags on retail and wholesale markets respectively and X is a vector of 
other influences on the retail price. 
Markets are not vertically integrated if the wholesale market price does not influence 
the price in the retail market. With short-run integration, price changes are fully and 
immediately passed on to the retail market with no lagged effects (strong form) or with lagged 
effects (weak form). Long-run integration requires that a unit price change is fully passed on 
over time but with the potential for lagged effects. Formally, the hypothesis for segmentation 
IS: 
for short-run integration (weak form): 
m n 
H2: 'Yo=l; L {3j+L 'Y;=O 
j=l ;=1 
for short-run integration (strong form):	 ­
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and for long-run integration: 
H4: L 
m 
(3/L 
n 
i'i=1 
j=1 i=O 
The appropriate test for these different hypotheses are F-tests where H ll H2, H3 and ~ are 
distributed as F(n+ 1,Tj, F(2,Tj, F(n+m+ 1,Tj and F(1,Tj respectively and T· is the number 
of observations corrected for the degrees of freedom used in the regression of the unrestricted 
model. 
The Ravallion model can be placed in a more general framework, based on co­
integration between price series. The first step is to determine the "order of integration" of 
each of the price series. A time series {Yt} is stationary if the joint distribution of Yt and Yt+T 
is independent of time. A series is said to be integrated of order 1 (=1(1)) if although the series 
is itself non-stationary, the first differences in this series form a stationary series. If the series 
must be differenced k times to achieve stationarity, then the series is l(k). The standard 
procedure for determining the order of integration of a time series is the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test which requires regressing ~Yt on a constant Yt-l and several lags of ~Yt" The 
t statistic on the estimated coefficient of Yt-1 is used to test the null hypothesis Ho: Yt - 1(1). 
The next step after testing for integration of the individual price series is to test for co­
integration between them. The notion of co-integration is based on the idea that although two 
time series are integrated, their difference or some other linear combination of them is 
stationary. Co-integration of the two time series is easily tested by the procedure of Engle and • 
Granger (1987). The first step of Engle and Granger's procedure is to perform an 015 
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regression of ~ on a constant and Wt A test of co-integration is then that the residuals Zr• 
from this co-integration regression be stationary. Thus the ADF tests applied to these residuals 
should yield statistics which are large and negative, so as to reject the null hypothesis of 
integration of order 1 in favor of stationarity. 
If prices are not co-integrated, the Ravallion model is not appropriate to measure price 
integration because variables that are integrated but not co-integrated can drift apart without 
bound and so no long-run equilibrium exists. If they are co-integrated, the Engle-Granger 
representation theorem validates the use of the Ravallion model, i.e. using an error correction 
mechanism taking the form of an auto-regression with a single "disequilibrium term" 
(Alexander, Wyeth, 1994). For those products that are co-integrated, a first difference 
specification with an error term correction term can be written as: 
M ="
m
a AR .+" 
n 
bilW-rtR t+WtW t+dX +€t L..J j't-J L..J I t-I t- t- t t 
j=t ;=0 
or 
m n 
M =" a.M .+" b.ilW .+ctz t+dX +€t L..J J t-J L..J I t-I t- t t 
j=t ;=0 
where Zr is the error-term derived from the estimation of the long run relationship (in which 
all variables are in levels). Zr can be interpreted as the distance that the system is away from 
equilibrium. An error correction model states that changes in ~ depend not only on changes 
in Wt but also on the extent of disequilibrium between the levels of ~ and Wt The error• 
correction property arises from the fact that if ~-t is above its equilibrium value R·, ~ will 
• 
be lower than would otherwise be the case and vice versa if ~.t is below R·. The speed with 
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which the system approaches its equilibrium depends on the proximity of C1 to -1 while the 
term bodW t is considered to be the immediate or short-run effect. 
The first difference formulation can be linked to the Ravallion specification because 
The error correction model can then be re-formulated in "level coefficients" as: 
LiR t ="(/1 w:-("(2 +... +"(,,)..1W:-1-("(3 +... +"(,,)..1 W:-2 -... -("(,,)..1 W:-n 
-«(32 +... +(3,jLiR - 1-(/33 +... +(3,jLiR _ - ••• -(/3,jLiR - +t t 2 t m 
("(0 +"(1+"(2 +... +"(,,) W:-1 -(1-(31-(32 - ... -(3,jRt-t 
In this way, retail price changes are attributed to the past wholesale and retail price, to the 
current change in the wholesale price and to the past changes in wholesale and retail prices." 
Given co-integration, the hypotheses for market integration can now be rewritten in 
easily testable hypotheses for: 
a. market segmentation: 
b. short-run integration (weak form): 
c. short-run integration (strong form): 
.. This regression would not be sensible unless the right-hand variables are co-integrated. 
A regression involving a right-hand set of variables integrated of an order different from the 
•
order of integration of the left-hand side is just as problematic as a regression between two 
unrelated non-stationary series. In each case, the distribution of the statistics are non-standard 
(Banerjee et al., 1993) 
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d. long-run integration: 
Hence, long-run integration is a necessary condition for short-run integration. The F-tests for 
the different hypotheses are distributed as F(n+ 1,T"), F(2,T"), F(n+m+3,T") and F(l,T") 
respectively. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS5 
A. Integration Between Wholesale and Retail Markets 
Table 3 shows the F-values for the tests for segmentation and integration of retail and 
wholesale markets using the traditional Ravallion procedure in levels. The residuals do not 
5 An efficient market, by definition, transmits prices instantly. But lags occur as inputs 
move through the marketing system. In this analysis, four lags for level regressions and three 
lags for difference equations are taken into consideration. Banerjee et al. (1993) report studies 
that find that the loss of efficiency from choosing too long a lag is small compared to too 
short a length. Compared to the fast turnover of retailers (Table 1), four months is a 
sufficiently long period. Four explanations for lags are generally given (Hall et al., 1981): a. 
time is required as food products are transported, processed, stored and moved through the 
wholesale and retail sector; b. repricing and remarking goods at the retail level is costly; c. 
price reporting and collection method may exaggerate actual lags; d. the market may have 
imperfections, such as a poor information transmission system or noncompetitive firms. 
The three first reasons do not seem to apply to the Zairian distribution system: a. for 
most commodities, retailers buy and sell their products in less than one week; b. prices are 
often not posted and if they are, it is often the quantity that is used as the adjustment variable 
instead of the posted price, i.e retailers will only mark large changes in their posted prices (50 
­percent, 100 percent) but will more readily adjust the quantity sold; c. price collection and 
reporting methods occurred during the same week; d. this might be true and this is one of the 
objects of this research. 
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show any significant auto-correlation. The null hypothesis of market segmentation between 
wholesale and retail prices is rejected for all products except for bananas. Most products are 
integrated in the long run, i.e. a unit price change at the wholesale level is fully transmitted 
to the retail level. Short-run integration is almost non existent for the level specification; only 
palm oil, maize in grains and local rice are short-run integrated in the weak sense. No product 
is short-run integrated in the strong sense. 
Table 3:	 F-values for the Tests of Long-Run and Short-Run Integration and Segmentation 
Between Wholesale and Retail Markets for the Main Agricultural Products in 
Kinshasa (Monthly Prices; Deflated; 1984-1989, In Levels) 
Long-run Short-run 
(strong) 
Short-run 
(weak) 
Segmentation 
Peanuts in shell 1.8· 5.0 4.3 11.7 
Peanuts grain 3.2· 23.4 3.6 18.5 
Plantains 1.0· 15.8 20.6 3.4 
Bananas 1.4· 18.9 15.5 1.1" 
Cassava BDD 3.6· 9.7 3.3 6.3 
Cassava BZ 0.15· 13.1 3.4 5.0 
Cassava flour 3.9· 24.6 10.4 3.4 
White Beans 7.0 9.3 12.5 19.3 
Colored Beans 7.9 5.8 4.7 54.7 
Palm oil 0.0· 18.4 0.2· 8.8 
Maize in grains 1.2· 10.3 1" 25.4 
Maize flour 0.1" 29.2 4 5.6 
Local rice 4.7 13.3 2.5· 41.2 
Imported rice 9.6 19.7 6.1 27.8 
Tomatoes 5.8 11.8 6.1 8.1 
'" - significant at the 1 % level 
The results of the augmented Dickey Fuller test show that, except for tomatoes, which 
is stationary in levels, all prices become stationary after first differencing, i.e. they are all 
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integrated of order 1 (=1(1». Results of the Engle-Granger co-integration test for retail prices 
as dependent and wholesale prices as independent variables imply that peanuts in grain (with 
peanuts in shell at the wholesale level), bananas, cassava, maize, imported rice and tomatoes 
are co-integrated over the different market levels as measured by the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic. 
The most consumed and perishable products are co-integrated, i.e. wholesale and retail prices 
move together in the long run. 
For those products that are co-integrated, F-values are calculated usmg an error 
correction model to test for short-run integration (Table 4). No product is strong short-run 
integrated and only cassava from Bas-Zaire is weak short-run integrated at the 1 percent level. 
The failure to find short-run integration is mostly due to the fact that the coefficient Ct (which 
measures the speed with which the system approaches its long-run equilibrium) is significantly 
different from -1. The coefficients bo (=')'0)' a measure for the immediate effect, are in most 
cases close to 1 (Table 4). Price differences are transmitted but there is no immediate correction 
for deviations from the long-run equilibrium. 
-

16
 
Table 4:	 F-values for the Tests of Strong and Weak Short-Run Integration between 
Wholesale and Retail Markets and the Value of the bo Coefficient for Co­
integrated Agricultural Products in Kinshasa (Monthly Prices; Deflated; 1984­
1989; Error Correction Model) 
Strong short­
. .
run mtegratIon 
Weak short-run 
integration 
bo 
Value Standard 
error 
Peanuts grain 
Bananas 
Cassava BDD 
Cassava BZ 
Maize in grains 
Maize flour 
Imported rice 
Tomatoes 
240.7 
48.5 
55.6 
46.7 
38.4 
158.2 
57.6 
17.1 
4.7 
5.7 
3.7 
1.7· 
5.0 
5.8 
2.7 
3.3 
1.5 
0.3 
1.1 
0.7 
1.1 
1.8 
1.3 
0.6 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
.1 
0.1 
0.1 
.. - significant at the 1 % level 
B. Integration Between Retail Markets 
Table 5 shows the level of retail prices of the nine most important retail markets in 
Kinshasa, where the average of all markets has been set equal to 100. There is a significant 
difference in prices between different retail markets. Some differences are apparently due to 
distribution systems for a particular product {e.g. beans are cheapest on Zomba-Zikida, close 
to the port where the beans from northern Zaire arrive} while for other price gaps, there is 
no conclusive explanation. Average differences in price levels between retail markets range 
from 31 percent for maize flour to 10 percent for imported rice. Agricultural product markets 
in Kinshasa are characterized by essentially identical commodities being sold at markedly • 
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different prices. The magnitudes of the price differences are sufficiently large that "location" 
or "service" differences cannot fully account for the observed price differences6• 
Based on the daily consumption of a household of eight persons in Kinshasa, the price 
of a food basket for each market is calculated. It is interesting to note that the price of this 
basket is highest on those markets which are not located near a semi-wholesale market, i.e. 
Marche Central, Lemba and Banda!. On those markets, the price level is 3 percent to 8 percent 
higher than the average of the city. Between the Marche Central and the market of Zomba-
Zikida, there is a price difference of 9 percent for a distance of only 2 km. The difference in 
price level between the Lemba market and the Matete market (the nearest semi-wholesale 
market) is 12 percent. 
• 
Stiglitz (1987) shows that with asymmetric information and positive search costs, 
theoretical models can be constructed that generate these kinds ~f price distributions. 
18 
6 
Table 5: Indices of Price Levels of the Main Agricultural Products on Nine Retail
 
Markets in Kinshasa during the Period 1984 - 1988 (Mean .. 100)
 
M.C. Z.Z. Gam Y.S. Lem Mat Mas 24N Ban• 
Cassava chips7 109 102 99 92 104 100 103 91 100 
Cassava flour 113 103 100 93 106 99 104 83 106 
Cassava roots 109 89 89 96 103 109 118 94 92 
Chikwangue 110 101 96 91 106 97 101 97 106 
Maize in grains 104 97 102 101 108 96 89 99 104 
Maize flour 120 104 101 94 102 90 89 99 103 
Local rice 94 94 96 103 105 96 107 102 103 
Imported rice 97 96 98 101 104 96 106 101 102 
Peanuts in shell 110 87 96 104 98 85 95 105 120 
Peanuts grain 101 98 98 98 106 95 96 101 107 
White beans 100 94 97 102 105 99 103 100 100 
Colored beans 97 91 96 104 107 98 106 99 101 
Bananas 110 105 102 94 102 84 93 102 108 
Plantains 110 103 100 99 97 85 96 101 110 
Cassava leaves 109 101 97 103 106 93 94 97 100 
Biteku-teku 101 97 92 105 115 93 102 96 99 
Ngai-ngai 105 95 95 102 115 93 93 100 102 
Courge 111 101 98 97 108 101 91 94 100 
Tomatoes 108 92 89 103 113 94 97 99 106 
Potatoes 111 90 87 119 118 96 91 94 93 
Basket 108 99 97 101 106 94 94 99 103 
*: M.C... Marche Central; Z.Z. = Zomba Zikida; Gam .. Gambela; Y.S... Yolo-Sud; Lem 
.. Lemba; Mat .. Matete; Mas = Masina; 24N = 24 Novembre; Ban = Bandal 
..
 
The difference in price level is partially explained by a difference in quality (cassava 
from Bandundu versus cassava from Bas-Zaire). 
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Price integration of the same product on different retail markets is tested using the co­
integration approach for three important products: maize, cassava and beans. At the 5 percent 
level, maize and beans are 1(1) on all markets. At the 1 percent level, all series are 1(1). 
To test for co-integration and short-run integration, the Marche Central for maize and 
cassava and Zikida for beans are chosen as the reference market and as the dependent variable. 
OLS estimates of the Ravallion type model may only be applied consistently to those 
equations for which the reference market is exogenous. The Marche Central as the biggest 
retail market and Zikida as the distribution center for beans are assumed to approach these 
exogenous conditions. The Dickey Fuller t-statistic to test for co-integration between price 
series shows that for maize and cassava, all retail markets are co-integrated with the Marche 
Central (Table 6). For white beans, at the 5 percent level three markets and at the 1 percent 
level five markets out of eight are co-integrated with the Zikida market. The hypothesis of 
weak and strong short-run integration is rejected for the three products on all markets given 
. .
cO-IntegratIon. 
-
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Table 6:	 Co-integration and Integration Tests for Maize Grains, White Beans and Cassava 
on Different Retail Markets in Kinshasa (1984-1986; Weekly Prices; Nominal; 
Three Lags) 
Dickey Fuller t- F-values"" 
statistic. " 
Weak short-run Strong short-run (co-integration) 
integration integration 
Maize grains: 
Bandal -4.8 20.2 18.0 
Bumbu -3.9 8.1 8.0 
Marche Central dependent var. 
- -
Gambela -4.2 17.4 16.0 
Lemba -5.4 5.9 5.5 
Masina -5.0 11.2 21.0 
Matete -4.1 9.3 10.4 
Yolo -4.7 3.8 3.4 
Zikida -4.8 12.7 11.3 
White beans: 
Bandal -4.8 3.6 4.2 
Bumbu -3.8 10.1 9.1 
Marche Central -4.5 8.9 8.3 
Gambela -4.4 5.5 5.4 
Lemba -3.6 20.3 28.6 
Masina -3.4 not co-into not co-into 
Matete -3.5 not co-into not co-into 
Yolo -3.5 not co-into not co-into 
Zikida dependent var. - -
Cassava: 
Bandal -4.8 7.7 7.0 
Bumbu -5.9 4.5 4.0 
Marche Central dependent var. --
Gambela -4.6 7.5 6.8 
Lemba -4.5 11.6 13.4 
Masina -4.4 10.67 16.6 
Matete -4.6 16.5 21.7 
Yolo -4.5 9.3 14.4 
Zikida -4.8 5.5 5.6 
-

"': MacKinnon critical values: 1%-4.43 
5%-3.84 
10%-3.54 
"'''': F" (120,8) at 5 % -= 2.02; F" (120,9) at 5 % -= 1.96 
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C. Inte&ration Between Transformed Products and Substitutes 
Engle and Granger (1987) argue that individual time series can wander extensively and 
yet some pairs of series may be expected to move so that they do not drift too far apart such 
as prices of the same commodity in different markets or close substitutes in the same market. 
Engle-Granger co-integration tests are done for related and transformed products (Table 7). At 
the retail level, maize grains - maize flour and imported rice - local rice are co-integrated. Only 
the products characterized by some kind of standardization (rice and maize) are co-integrated 
(rice is imported in standard bags and maize bags are standardized because trade is in the hands 
of one NGO and a few big traders). At the wholesale level, cassava from Bandundu and from 
Bas-Zaires show a significant Dickey-Fuller t-statistic. Cassava from Bandundu and Bas-Zaire 
can be considered substitutes at the wholesale level while at the retail level, they are not co­
integrated and are directed to different markets. 
S The cassava chips from Bandundu are considered to be of a lower quality than the 
cassava chips from Bas-Zaire because of the higher expected losses (because of the shocks on • 
the trips, the chips are more damaged from the longer trip from Bandundu than from Bas­
Zaire) and a less white color (caused by drying in the sun or by smoke and by the water 
composition during the rettery of cassava). 
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Table 7: Engle-Granger Co-integration Tests for Transformed Products and Substitutes 
(Monthly Deflated Products; Four Lags; 1984-1989; DMPCC Data) 
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Trend No Trend 
Retail prices: 
Peanuts in shell, peanuts in grain -2.42 -3.23 
Plantains, bananas -3.26 -2.72 
White beans, colored beans -3.78 -0.79 
Cassava Bandundu, cassava Bas-Zaire -2.13 -2.24 
Cassava Bandundu, cassava flour -2.83 -2.62 
Cassava Bandundu, cassava roots -3.09 -2.53 
Cassava Bas-Zaire, chikwange -3.52 -1.91 
Maize grains, maize flour -3.81 -3.61 
Imported rice, local rice -4.79 -3.94 
Wholesale prices: 
Plantains, bananas -2.53 -2.95 
Cassava Bandundu, cassava Bas-Zaire -4.15 -4.31 
White beans, colored beans -3.06 -2.42 
MacKinnon Critical values: trend 1 % 
no trend 
5% 
10 % 
1% 
5% 
10 % 
-4.56 
-3.93 
-3.60 
-4.06 
-3.42 
-3.11 
D. Other Influences on the Retail Mar~in and on Price Transmission 
Time within the marketing season represents important changes in demand and supply 
for seasonal commodities. Most direct retailing costs like taxes, the price of a table, transport, 
etc. do not have a seasonal component. Other costs which are more difficult to measure might 
fluctuate over the year. As the season progresses, availability of seasonal substitute products 
may increase. Because of lower quality (more humidity) and higher perishability during the 
wet season, marketing losses will be larger, which will increase the marketing margin. 
-
,,­
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Using the Ravallion approach, F-tests are performed to test for the significance of the 
different "other" variables in the X matrix of the co-integrated products using an ECM (Table 
8). At the 1 percent level, seasonality for tomatoes and exchange rates for maize flour are 
found to be significant. Tomatoes are only produced during a limited period in the year and 
thin markets might be an explanation for the significant seasonality. Gasoline does not 
significantly affect the price transmission of the co-integrated products. 
Table 8:	 F-values for Tests of Other Influences on Price Transmission between Wholesale 
and Retail Markets for the Co-integrated Agricultural Products in Kinshasa 
(Monthly Prices; Deflated; 1984-1989; Error Correction Model) 
Exchange Rate' Gasoline Seasonality 
Peanuts grain 1.15 0.13 1.45 
Bananas 0.23 0.25 1.25 
Cassava BDD 0.52 1.50 0.23 
Cassava BZ 0.36 0.88 0.28 
Maize in grains 0.15 0.29 1.92 
Maize flour 8.85" 0.01 3.32 
Imported rice 0.05 0.46 0.66 
Tomatoes 0.18 1.60 5.14" 
#: parallel exchange rate 
*: significant at the 1 % level 
Seasonal indices are calculated for the distribution margin of all products. For some 
products, there is a seasonal movement in the distribution margin but this is not true for all 
products. The amplitude of the seasonal fluctuations in the margin is much larger than that 
in the retail prices but the stability of the movement is less. Of the 132 indices (11 products 
multiplied by 12 months), 28 are significant with a probability of 0.68 and 4 with a probability 
of 0.95 (Table 9). The amplitude varies from 122 percent for maize to 38 percent for regular 
• 
.. 
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bananas. The marketing margin is largest when retail prices are highest and smallest when 
retail prices are lowest. 
Table 9:	 Amplitudes and Maximum and Minimum Periods for Seasonal Movements in 
the Retail Margin on the Markets of Kinshasa during the Period 1984-1989 
(Monthly Prices) 
Product Amplitude 
in % 
Minimum Maximum Significant 
indices 
(at 68 %) 
3Cassava Bandundu 42 August February 
Cassava Bas-Zaire 51 February September 2 
Corn 122 June November 7 
Rice 63 February July 1 
Peanuts 54 June January 2 
White Beans 95 October February 2 
Colored Beans 44 March January 1 
Tomatoes 84 October May 5 
Plantains 64 September July 2 
Bananas 38 February June 1 
Palm oil 57 December September 2 
Other price movements in retail prices exist. One is related to the timing of the payday 
(Minten, 1995). Cassava prices show monthly movements, i.e. the price at the end and at the 
beginning of the month is eleven percent higher than in the middle of the month. Most 
traders are aware of this movement and adjust to it. This means that the monthly movement 
in demand is even larger. This movement is caused by the fact that most consumers get their 
salary on a fixed date: government officials get it· on the 20th of the month; workers in the 
private sector often receive an advance on the 15th of the month and the rest at the end; most 
workers in the informal sector are paid at the end of the month. This monthly movement is 
-
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especially harmful for the poor because they purchase small quantities of food in small time 
intervals. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Retail margins of agricultural products make up a significant part of the final consumer 
price on the markets of Kinshasa. Price integration tests are performed between products, 
between retail markets and between wholesale and retail markets to better understand price 
behavior in these markets. Price integration is measured by incorporating the co-integration 
concept into the "classical" long-run and short-run test. 
The main results are: 1. Between the wholesale and retail level, co-integration for some 
products is found. Although wholesale prices are input prices for retailers, strong and weak 
short-run integration with retail prices is generally absent. 2. Between retail markets price 
differences exist which do not reflect service or transportation costs. Retail markets located 
near semi-wholesale markets are characterized by lower prices. Most retail markets are co­
integrated among each other for the most important products but no evidence for short-run 
integration is found. 3. No co-integration is found between transformed products and the raw 
material at the retail level, except for the transformation of maize from grain to flour. Local 
and imported rice are the only products that are co-integrated and can be considered close 
substitutes at the retail level. 4. No other factors influence significantly the wholesale - retail 
price transmission. Retail margins show large but unstable seasonal movements which might 
• 
be a cause of food insecurity for the urban consumer. 
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Better access to pnce information could be a remedy for the lack of short-run 
integration. Kinshasa is characterized by a number of scattered semi-wholesale markets without 
adequate infrastructure. One or a small number of large public wholesale and retail markets 
could provide Kinshasa with a location where large numbers of wholesalers, retailers and even 
consumers can exchange goods. They can be a better way to bring buyers and sellers together 
with a more efficient price transmission mechanism and characterized by less spatial variability 
in prices. Second, public gathering and dissemination of information on food prices are likely 
to improve market performance. Marion (1986) shows in an empirical study on the impact of 
information on food prices that increased information leads to a more efficient allocation of 
resources, a reduction of price dispersion and a lowering of average retail prices. 
• 
" 
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